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                 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                      FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
11 MICHAEL ZWEBNER,
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             Plaintiff,
                                      No. CV-00-1322-HU
13
        v.
14 JOHN DOES ANONYMOUS
                                      ORDER
   FOUNDATION, INC., a
                                  )
15
  corporation; LES FRENCH;
                                 and
                                      )
   Does 2 through 100,
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                                 )
             Defendants.
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18 Renee E. Rothauge
   BULLIVANT HOUSER BAILEY
19 300 Pioneer Tower
  888 SW Fifth Avenue
20 | Portland, Oregon 97204-2089
21
        Attorney for Plaintiff
22 George P. Fisher
   GEORGE P. FISHER, ATTORNEY AT LAW
23 1001 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1660
   Portland, Oregon 97204
24
        Attorney for Defendant John Does Anonymous Foundation,
25 Inc.
26 Les French
   4380 SW Macadam Avenue, Suite 210
27 Portland, Oregon 97201
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        Defendant Pro Se
   1 - ORDER
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1 HUBEL, Magistrate Judge:

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Plaintiff Michael Zwebner brings this tort action against 3 defendants John Does Anonymous Foundation, Inc. (JDAF), Les 4 French, 1 and Does 2 through 100. Plaintiff alleges that the JDAF, which operates and maintains an Internet bulletin board 6 website called "JohnDoes.org," receives material from users and 7 publishes it on the website, allowing it to be transmitted to 8 computers around the world. Plaintiff contends that defamatory 9 material about him has been published via this website and that 10 he has been harmed from such action. Plaintiff brings claims 11 for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 12 and false light invasion of privacy. He also seeks injunctive 13 relief.

Plaintiff has successfully obtained an order of default 15 against the JDAF. Plaintiff now moves for entry of default 16 | judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). For 17 the reasons explained below, I defer ruling on the motion for entry of default judgment until such time as the damages phase of the case against Les French, the only answering defendant.

I. Need for Prima Facie Hearing

Under Rule 55, if the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain 22 or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the clerk

Les French is now properly named in the caption as a 24 result of Judge King's recent affirmance of my earlier Order 25 allowing French to appear as a defendant in place of one of the John Does, because of the allegations made against one of the John Doe defendants who goes by "Internetzorro," and French's admission that he is Internetzorro. All parties 27

should now use the caption as it appears here on all future submissions.

^{2 -} ORDER

1 may enter a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). In all other cases, the party must apply to the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). The rule provides:

> If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper and shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties when and as required by any statute of the United States.

<u>Id.</u> As explained by the Second Circuit, "[d]amages, which are neither susceptible of mathematical computation nor liquidated as of the default, usually must be established by the plaintiff in an evidentiary proceeding in which the defendant has the opportunity to contest the amount." Greyhound Exhibitgroup, 14 <u>Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp.</u>, 973 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1992).

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Although in some cases a court may award unliquidated damages on the basis of detailed affidavit testimony alone, <u>see</u> <u>United Artists Corp. v. Freeman</u>, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979) (damages for default judgment should not have been awarded without either hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits 20 21 establishing necessary facts), Transportes Aereos De Angola v. 22 <u>Jet Traders Inv. Corp.</u>, 624 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D. Del. 1985) (damages for default could be established without hearing when 24 party presented definite figures in documentary evidence or detailed affidavits), the court retains great discretion in determining whether to conduct a hearing to assess damages upon default. <u>See Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal</u>, 826 F.2d 915, 27 $|\!|\!|917$ (9th Cir. 1987) ("Rule 55 gives the court considerable

1 leeway as to what it may require as a prerequisite to the entry of a default judgment.").

While plaintiff has submitted affidavits in support of his damages claim, I prefer to conduct an in-person prima facie hearing for several reasons. First, as discussed during the March 28, 2001 hearing on the issue of a prima facie hearing, there are questions of law which must be addressed before I can conclude that plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the asserted Argument from counsel at a prima facie hearing would claims. assist me in resolving those questions of law. Second, given the amount of damages sought by plaintiff, over \$18 million, I prefer to evaluate plaintiff's testimony in person with the opportunity to inquire of plaintiff if needed.

Third, although I have not yet reached a conclusion as to the level of the JDAF's participation in the prima facie hearing, I anticipate that at a minimum, the JDAF will be able to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses and object to plaintiff's See, e.g., Howard v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 271 S.C. evidence. 238, 241, 246 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1978) (defaulted defendant can participate in proceedings relative to the assessment of damages, but only to the extent of cross-examination and objection to plaintiff's evidence; expressly rejecting assessment of damages at ex parte hearing at which only the 24 plaintiff would appear and a full adversary contest in which the defaulted party could produce its own evidence in rebuttal or mitigation); see also Bonilla v. Trebol Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 1998) ("ordinary rule is that a defaulting defendant is entitled to contest damages and to participate in

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1 a hearing on damages, should one be held."), cert. denied, 526 $2 \parallel U.S.$ 1098 (1999). Given the JDAF's right to participate, at 3 | least at some level, in the assessment of damages, a prima facie 4 hearing is the most convenient means of affording the JDAF that opportunity.

Based on these factors, I determine that a prima facie 7 | hearing on the requested damages to be assessed against the JDAF \parallel is in the parties' and the Court's best interests.

II. Timing of Prima Facie Hearing

Plaintiff seeks resolution of the default judgment motion and the assessment of damages against the JDAF as soon as practicable. The JDAF argues that it must be deferred until later in the case. I agree with the JDAF.

Courts from across the country have consistently held that "it is appropriate to enter judgment solely as to liability and not as to the amount of damages to be assessed against the defaulting party, since a separate determination of damages would pose the prospect of inconsistent judgments." Anita's New Mexico Style Mexican Food v. Anita's Mexican Foods Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-510-A, 1998 WL 526770 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citing 21 Pfanenstiel Architects, Inc. v. Chouteau Petroleum Co., 978 F.2d 22 430, 433 (8th Cir. 1992); <u>Hunt v. Inter-Globe Energy, Inc.</u>, 770 23 F.2d 145, 147-48 (10th Cir. 1985); <u>Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard</u> 24 Pipes & Concrete Prod., Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1324 (7th Cir. 25 | 1983)); <u>see also Montcalm Pub. Corp. v. Ryan</u>, 807 F. Supp. 975, 977-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (damages judgment against defaulting 27 defendants premature since they allegedly were jointly and 28 |severally liable with nondefaulting defendants; proper procedure

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1 was to consolidate the inquest to determine the level of damages as to the defaulting defendants with the damages aspect of the 3 trial against the nondefaulting defendants).

The lead case is <u>Frow v. De La Vega</u>, 82 U.S. 552 (1872). Plaintiff argues that its holding does not apply here because it applies only in cases where there is true joint liability, not joint and several liability. Plaintiff cites <u>In re: Uranium</u> Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) in support of his argument. There, the court held that Frow did not preclude the entry of a default judgment against the defaulted parties before the adjudication on the merits of the claims as to the remaining defendants, where liability was joint and several. Id. at 1258.

A close reading of the case, however, shows that the default judgment at issue in that discussion was only a judgment as to liability. Later in the Opinion, the court tackles the issue of the timing of the hearing on damages. It notes that when joint and several liability is asserted on a claim, a problem of "possible inconsistency" could arise because there could be "two distinct damages awards[.]" Id. at 1262. As explained by the "[j]ust as the several or independent nature of court: 22 | plaintiff's claim permits different findings as to liability of 23 | individual defendants, the joint nature of plaintiffs' claim 24 prohibits different findings as to damages against all defendants." <u>Id.</u> Thus, the court held, while "[the plaintiff] 26 has secured a valid default judgment as to the defaulters' 27 | liability, a damages hearing may not be held until the liability 28 of each defendant has been resolved." <u>Id.</u> If liability is

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1 | found against the answering defendants, then "a single damages 2 hearing can be held." <u>Id.</u>

Although I found no Ninth Circuit cases interpreting Frow, 4 the persuasive authority from other circuit and district courts leads me to conclude that, in this case, where joint and several liability is alleged, 2 a risk of inconsistent results exists and 7 thus, the prima facie hearing on plaintiff's motion for default judgment against the JDAF should be deferred until the liability of French has been determined.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's motion for default judgment (#18) is deferred 12 until the damages phase of the case against French.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this ______, 2001.

/s/

United States Magistrate Judge

Dennis James Hubel

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Although there are no express allegations of joint and several liability, the allegations in the Complaint suggest that joint and several liability is asserted. <u>See</u>, <u>e.q.</u>, Compl. at \P 5 (alleging that the John Does and the JDAF acted in concert). Additionally, references to defendants are in the plural throughout the Complaint. Finally, in the March 28, 2001 hearing, plaintiff's counsel indicated that this is a 28 case of joint and several liability.

^{7 -} ORDER